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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses thequestion of reform of theinternational
monetary system. It starts by
identifying the sources ofdisenchantment
with the performance ofthe present regime of
floating exchange rates
and by Outlining thereasons for the lack ofconvergence of views about
the characteristics ofthe desired system. Acentral theme in the dis-
cussion is that a reform of
the monetary systemWithout a fundamental
change in macroeconomic policies
may be harmful. The analysisproceeds
by examining the broaderissues and principlesrelevant for an evaluation
of reform. The keyquestions are: what should be
reformed, what are the
costs of reform and when shouldthe reform occur. Inthis context special
attention is given to the
"target—zones" proposal forexchange rate
management. The paper concludeswith the observation thata reform of
the system should not bevIewed as an instrument for
crisis management
dominated by short—termconsiderations, but rather should beguided by
long—term perspective. It isargued that if the root cause ofthe current
economic difficulties is fiscalimbalances In the worldeconomy, then a
drastic reform of theinternational monetarysystem (if one is needed)




700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431A casual glance through theproceedings of past annual meetings of the
American Economic Association reveals thatin almost every year during the
past twenty years presidents of the AEA have devotedat least one session to
an examination of issues concerning the
international monetary system.
Prominent on the agenda has been thequestion of reform. How should the
international monetary system be reformedso as to function more effectively?
The premise underlying this question isthat the internationalmonetary system
has failed and that it must be reformedby an institutional change. In what
follows I present some skepticalnotes on both the verdict on the failure of
the system and on someproposals for reform, especially thetarget-zones
proposal.
To set the stage it is worthnoting that one of the main sources of
disenchantments with the presentmonetary system has been the unpredictability
of exchange rates. There has beennothing more confusing than reading through
the ex-post journalisticexplanations offered for the day-to-daychanges in
the U.S. dollar. For example,over the past few years we were told that "The
dollar fell because themoney supply grew faster than expected -- thereby
generating inflationary expectations," buton another occasion we were told
that "The dollar rse because
the money supply grew faster thanexpected-
thereby generating expectations that the Fedis likely to tightenup and raise
interest rates." On another datewe were told that "The dollar fell since the
budget deficit exceeded previous forecasts-- therebygenerating inflationary
expectations on the belief that the Fed willhave to monetize the deficit,"
but, on another occasion we were toldthat "The dollar rose since thebudget
deficit exceeded previous forecasts-- therebygenerating expectations that
government borrowing -needswill drive up interest rates since theFed is be
unlikely to give up its firm stance." Onyet another day we were told that
"The dollar fell since oilprices fell -- therebyhurting Mexico and other2
debt-ridden oil-producing countrieswhose bad fortune may bring aboutthe
collapse of important U.S. banks,"but, on another occasion we weretold that
"The dollar since oil prices fell -- therebyhelping the debt-ridden oil-
consuming countries whose improvedfortune will help the vulnerable position
of important U.S. banks." More recentlythe dollar changed again, and this
time the explanation was a bit more sophisticated"The dollar changed because
the extent of the revision of theestimated GNP growth rate was smaller than
the expected revision of previous forecastsof these estimates." One cannot
but sympathize with the difficultiesshared by newspaper reporters and
financial analysts who feel obligated to come upwith daily explanations for
daily fluctuations of exchange rates,and one can only imagine the deep
frustration that yielded the recentheadline in the International Herald
Tribune according to which "The dollar rose on nonews."
The dismal performance of short-term forecastingdoes not reflect a
lack of effort. Rather, it is an intrinsiccharacteristic of efficient asset
markets.Difficulties in forecasting short-term indicesof stock markets
(like the Dow-Jones index) do not callhowever, for a reform of the way stock
markets operate. For similar reasons oneshould not assess the performance of
the international monetary system on thebasis of short-term forecastability
of exchange rates.This does not imply of course that the present monetary
system is without faults orthat it should not be reformed. It implies,
however, that if a reform is warrantedthen it better be justified on dif-
ferent grounds.
A second noteworthy observation is that overthe years both academics
and policy makers have made numerous proposalsfor reform while, at the same
time, the monetary system itself hasbeen in a constant state of change. It
evolved from the gold standard to paper money,from the Bretton Woods system3
to managed float.We also had the Gold Commission butstayed with floating
rates and now attention is focused ontarget zones, with soft or hard margins.
In spite of the ongoing debate thereseems to be little convergence of
views about the characteristics of the desiredsystem. This lack of conver-
gence in my view does not reflect lack of effort.Rather, it reflects more
fundamental factors that areunlikely to vanish over time. Severalare
noteworthy. First, participants in the debate havenot shared the presumption
concerning the relevant alternative to thesystem they promote. Thus, extreme
promoters of fixed rates believe that the relevantchoice is between a "good
fix" and a "bad flex"; on the otherhand, extreme promoters of flexible rates
believe that the relevant choice is betweena "bad fix" and a "good flex." As
is obvious, if these are the alternativechoices the outcomes are self-evi-
dent, for who would not prefer a "good fix"over a "bad flex?" And, by the
same token, who would not prefer a "good flex"over a "bad fix?" In reality,
however, the choices are much morecomplex and much less trivial sincethey
may involve comparisons between a "good fix" anda "good flex" or, even more
frequently, between a "bad fix" and a "bad flex."When these are the choices,
one may expect lack of unanimity. Reasonable
people may also differ in their
assessments of which "good" system ismore likely to gravitate toward its
"bad" counterpart.Furthermore, the likelihood that agiven "good" system
would deteriorate and be transformedinto its "bad" counterpart dependson the
circumstances and, therefore, it islikely that some countries would be wise
to choose greater fixity of rates whileother countries would beequally wise
to choose greater flexibility.
Second, there are differentconcepts of the "equilibrium" exchange
rate and not all participants in the debateshare the same concept. A trivial
definition would identify the equilibriumrate as the one that is generatedby
the free operation of the marketplace. A more subtle definitionemphasizes4
the sustainability of policies asthe criterion for equilibrium. Accordingly,
if for example, the current exchangerate reflects unsustainable budget
deficits, then this rate is notviewed as an equilibrium rate even thoughit
reflects equality between demand and supplyin the market place. An even more
subjective view emphasizes the consequences
of the exchange rate as the ul-
timate criterion.Accordingly, if the exchange rate yieldsundesirable
results in terms of growth, export, resourceallocation, unemployment and the
like, then this rate is notviewed as an equilibrium rate even though it
emerges from the market placeand reflects sustainable policies.
Third, different countries face differentshocks. On purely theoreti-
cal grounds it is clear that the appropriate exchange-rateregime depends on
the nature and origin of shocks. Are theshocks real or monetary? Are they
induced by the private sector or by the public sectoris their origin domestic
or foreign? Are they permanent ortransitory? The list of questions is long
and circumstances vary across countries and overtime.
Fourth, the cost of mistaken policiesand the ability to correct
errors differ across countries. They depend onthe exchange-rate regime and
on the structural characteristics ofthe economy. Countries differ from each
other in the flexibility of their economic system (e.g.,the degree of wage
jndexation, labor mobility, external and internaldebt position) as well as in
the flexibility of the policy making process (e.g.the speed by which fiscal
and monetary policies can be assessed and modified).
Fifth, countries differ from each other accordingto the various
criteria governing the choice of optimal currency areas.These criteria
include the degree of openness of the economy,the size of the economy, the
degree of commodity diversification,the degree of inflation rates among
prospective members, the degree of capitalmobility, the degree of other
prevailingformsof integration (like custom unions), the degreeof5
similarities of tax structures and
other fiscal characteristics and the
degree of similarities of external and domestic
monetary and real shocks.
Sixth, views differ about the functions ofexchange rates in general
and of market mechanisms in
particular. On the one hand there are those who
believe that exchange ratesare just a nuisance, especially ifthey move, and
anything that moves had better bestopped (one only wonders whetherproponents
of this view would also like tosee greater fixity of stock marketindices?).
There are also those who, in
spite of the meager evidence, advocate thebubble
theory according to which exchange rates have"life of their own" unrelated to
"fundamentals."On the other hand there are those whoview exchange rates as
an important gauge which provides valuableinformation about current as well
as prospective policies.According to this view manipulating theexchange
rate by intervention and blaming the
volatility, unpredictability and
misalignment on the monetary system makesas much sense as blaming the
messenger for conveying bad news.
Finally, there are also different views aboutthe advisability and
effectiveness of foreign-exchange
intervention. In spite of growing evidence
that the effectiveness of sterilizedintervention in exchange-ratemanagement
is very limited (at leastas it operates through the portfolio-balance
mechanism), there are those who are stillready to rely on such intervention.
In principle, sterilized intervention
can be effective by signalling to the
market the intent of policy makers.Since the credibility, andthereby the
effectiveness, of such signals, depend on the trackrecord of past Policies,
circumstances differ across countries.
The foregoing arguments explainwhy views about the need for, and the
desired characteristics of a reformare likely to differ across countriesand
are not likely to converge with thepassage of time.6
Has the system failed? It is clearthat during the past decade for-
eign exchange markets have gonethrough great difficulties. In addition to
the volatility and the unpredictabilityof exchange rates, there is the per-
ception that real exchange rateshave been misaligned, and that this misalign-
ment has been costly in termsof resource allocation and general economic
performance.
The relevant question is whether these faultsreflect deficien-
cies of the international monetary system orof macroeconomic policies? I
believe that faulty policies, especially thelack of synchronization of fiscal
policies in the U.S., West Germanyand Japan, are at the root-cause of the
misalignments.Reforming the monetary system without reformingthe policies
will not do any good and may in fact do harm by divertingattention from the
root-cause of the problem to the monetary system.
There is also the view that the system hasfailed since it did not
yield current-account balance amongthe major trading partners. Taken by
itself, however, this should be viewed as oneof the achievements of the
monetary system.The ability to rely on international capital markets to
smooth out consumption in spite of real shocksshould not be viewed as a
failure.
We may also wish to ask whether the United Statescould have carried
out its highly successful disinflation policyof the early l980s while com-
mitted to fixed exchange rates?I believe not! The key point that needs
emphasis is that the volatility and the misalignmentof exchange rates may not
be the source of the difficulties but rather amanifestation of the prevailing
package of macroeconomic policies. Fixing ormanipulating the rates without
introducing a significant change intothe conduct of policies may not improve
matters at all. It may amount to breakingthe thermometer of a patient suf-
fering from high fever instead of providinghim with proper medication. The
absence of the thermometer will only confuse matters andwill reduce the7
information essential forPolicymaking. If volatile eventsand macropoljcjes
are not allowed to bereflected in the foreign
exchange market, they are
likely to be transferred
to, and reflected in, othermarkets (such as labor
markets) where they cannot bedealt with in as efficienta manner.
The preceding
argument ignores, however, one ofthe important charac-
teristicsofthe gold-dollarsystem -theimposition of discipline.
Accordingly, it could beargued that the obligation to
peg the rate or to
follow a predetermined
intervention rule would alter
fundamentally the conduct
of policy byintroducing discipline. Thisview, however, is questionablefor
two reasons. First, it could equally be
argued that by being highlyvisible
flexible exchangerates also impose disciplinesince current and(expected) future policiesare immediately madetransparent to both private andpublic
sectors at home and abroad.
Indeed, the G-5 Plazaagreement of September 1985
may be viewed as a manifestationof the disciplinary
capabilities of flexible
exchange rates. Furthermore, it may beargued that nationalgovernments are
unlikely to adjust the conductof domestic policiesso as to be disciplinedby the exchange rateregime. Rather, it ismore reasonable to assume thatthe
exchange rate regime islikely to adjust to whatever
discipline national
governmen5 choose to have.It may be noted inpassing that this is indeed
one of the more potent
arguments against the restorationof the gold standard.
If governmen werewilling to follow policies
consistent with the maintenance
of a gold standard, thenthe gold standard itselfwould not benecessary; if,
however, governmentswere not willing to follow
such policies, then the
introduction of the gold
standard per se would not
restore stability since,
before long, the standardwould have to be abandoned.
Webster's dictionary definesreform as an improvementand a removal of
faults.How can anyone beagainst reform? The key
questions, however, are
iqj should be reformed, what
are the os of the reformand when should such8
reform be adopted. A prerequisite
for target zones is that therebe agreement
on the approximatevalue of the equilibrium exchange rate,
on the boundaries
of the zones, and on the actionsthat must take place once theboundaries are
reached. At the present such agreement
is absent. Even if there is agreement
on the "equilibrium" exchange
rates one needs to specifyin detail what
happens if the boundariesare exceeded? It is not enoughto say "push them
back."We must decide which countryshould bear the burden of adjustmentand
which policy will effect that move
-- monetary,fiscal, government spending,
tax?Once this is recognized itbecomes clear that the keydifficulties may
not lie in the formal structureof the present international monetary system
but rather in the overall mixof macroeconomic policies.
Supporters of target zones saythat it is just a matter of tactics
whether one examines the system bylooking through the exchange ratelens or
through the global lens and
that they prefer to focus on the exchangerate
lens.I disagree.I believe that the differencebetween the twolensesis
fundamental.It is not a matter of tactics,but is the difference between
having a general frameworkand having a particular framework.It is the
difference between patching up ahole here and forgetting that the damis
going to collapse there versushaving a consistent setof policies. In
principle the adoption of target zonescould be acceptable if they encompassed
the entire array of macroeconomicpolicies, including in particularfiscal
policies. At present the diverging
international positions of fiscal policies
suggest that it is entirelyunlikely that international agreement onsuch a
sweeping reform is feasible. Mostof the burden, therefore, is likely tofall
on the instruments of monetarypolicy.As long as fiscal policies are
misaligned, a "successful" targetingof the exchange rate by using monetary
policies may exacerbate
the departures from the optimal mixof fiscal and9
monetary policies and may be
very costly in terms of the overalleconomic
system.
An argument favoringtarget zones is that thevery process of negotia-
tions is likely to enhancethe degree of internationalpolicy coordination.
It must be noted, however,
that successful coordinationefforts have also
occurred during the past decade(e.g., the U.S. dollarsupport package of
November 1978, the Bonneconomic summit of 1978 andmost recently the C-S
agreement of September 1985).
Further, it might be argued thatcoordination
should not be complete, because
the perception of independent
monetary policy
may be necessary for sustainingconfidence that monetarypolicy will not be
inflationary in the long run.In addition, there is thedanger that the
processs of negotiatingtarget zones could produce dangerous
frictions among
the negotiating partiesand could leadultimately to a reduced level of
coordination in this and otherareas.
Every system must have asafety valve which allows some
flexibility
and prevents a crisisand collapse withevery conflict. With misaligned
fiscal Policies and with
monetary policies geared towardsexchangerate
targeting, national goverrmentsmay be forced to exercise their
sovereignty by
resorting to protectionistic tradePolicies -- toan even greater extent than
has been the case under
the present system offloating rates with independent
monetary policy. The growing frustrationwith the efforts to reducethe U.S.
fiscal deficit byconventional measures havebrought about new desperate
arguments for the adoption of
protectionist measures likeimport surcharges.
The danger with suchrecommendations is that theymight receive the political
support of two otherwise unrelated
groups. They are likely to gain thesup-
port of the traditional advocates
of protectionism who claimto defend local
industry and workers from whatthey believe is foreign unfaircompetition.
But, more dangerously,they may gain thesupport of those whose exclusive10
concern with the budgetdeficit leads them to supportalmost any policy that
raises fiscal revenue.Import surcharges, oncein place (even those sur-
charges that are adopted as "temporary
measures") are hard to remove since, as
George Stigler once
remarked "a sustained policythat has real effects has
many good friends."
At the present there are veryfew measures whose long-
term costs to the interdependent
world economy may be as high asprotectionist
measures.Taxes on trade will hurt exports,and will restore inward looking
economic isolationism insteadof outward looking economiccoordination.
Protectionist measures willtransmit the wrong signals tothose developing
countries that are still attemptingto resist domestically popular pressures
to default on their debt,and, further, they may ignite atrade war. This
argument should beconsidered against the claim that by preventingmisalign-
ments of exchange rates targetzones reduce the protectionist pressures.With
misaligned fiscal policies the net
effect of target zones for exchange rates,
implemented through monetary policy,are not clear cut.
The key point made by proponents
of target zones is that such a system
encompasses the bestof both worlds --itposses the flexibilityof the
flexible exchange-rate regime as
well as the stability of the fixed exchange-
rate regime. The same logiccould be used, however, to argue thatthis hybrid
system encompassesthe wors of both worlds -- itpossess the instabilityof
flexible rates and the unsustainabil1tYof fixed rates. For in contrast with
fixed parities, the target zones are
moving. As they move, how do we escape
from the inherent difficultyof having the private sector speculate against
governments?In the absence of an anchorwhat ensures credibility? How
exactly are conflicts resolved?What ensures that the moving target zonesdo
not increase turbulence inthe foreign exchange market rather thanreduce it?
A central feature of any operational
monetary system must be a formal
resolution of the so-called n-l problem.We have n currencies and only n-l11
independent exchange rates.We thus have one degree offreedom and its
disposal must be explicitlyspecified. It takes two totango and it takes one
for intervention. The original Bretton Woodssystem allocated the degree of
freedom to the United States
which obliged itself topeg the price of gold at
$35 an ounce; the other n-lcountries then coimnitted themselvesto peg their
currencies to the U.S. dollar. Adesign of the international
monetary system
is not complete unless itprovides an explicit resolutionto this n-l problem.
Therefore, it is essential to askhow the various
proposals, including those
for target zones, deal withthe extra degree of freedom.
As a general rule,a reform of the system shouldnot viewed as an
instrument for crisismanagement. The considerationsappropriate for crisis
management focus on .hort-term effectiveness.
In contrast the considerations
appropriate for designing the
optimal monetary system should begoverned by a
inz-term perspective The two need not coincideand it is sensible to
separate them.In the present contextthe short-term crisisconcerns the
fiscal imbalances in theworld economy rather than themonetary system. To be
sure, the existing international
monetary system is not perfect and itmight
benefit from a face liftor even from a more drasticreform. But such a
reform should better waituntil nations restore amore sustainable course of
fiscal management.
A reform of the international
monetary system should be viewedas a
constitutional change that shouldnot be taken lightly.The success of a new
monetary arrangement depends on theadoption of a consistent set ofpolicy
tools and on a reasonable
understanding of the implications ofeach course of
action. In these matters the cost of
delaying the adoption of a newinterna-
tional monetaryarrangement until its full implications
are understood is
likely to be small relative to thecost of a premature implementation
The
variousproposalsfor reform of thepresent internationalmonetary system have12
many attractions.But since they are novel, prudence is clearlycalled for.
More discussions and critical evaluations canbe highly desirable. In view of
this it may be a good place to concludewith a quote from John Maynard Keynes'
remarks in his closing speech at the originalBretton Woods Conference held
over 40 years ago. Speaking onthe desirability of critical evaluations of
the proposed system Keynes said: "1 am greatlyencouraged, I confess, by the
critical, sceptical and even carping spiritin which our proceedings have been
watched and welcomed in the outside world. Howmuch better that our projects
should begin in disillusion than that theyshouldinit!"